

July 29, 2026

Mr. Tim Cook
Chief Executive Officer
Apple Inc.
One Apple Park Way
Cupertino, CA 95014

Dear Mr. Cook:

We write to express our concern regarding credible reports that Apple has begun testing DRAM from ChangXin Memory Technologies (CXMT) for potential use in devices and is allegedly lobbying U.S. federal officials against national security controls to permit the broader use of Chinese memory chips in Apple products.¹ This short-sighted move would be a mistake, and it would ensure the world's most valuable consumer-electronics company grows dependent on critical supplies from a firm the United States government has formally designated as a Chinese military company. We urge Apple to abandon any effort to incorporate memory from CXMT, Yangtze Memory Technologies Co. (YMTC), or any other Chinese state-backed supplier into any of its products.

The U.S. government has been clear that both CXMT and YMTC present significant national security threats. The Department of Defense designated both CXMT and YMTC as Chinese military companies under Section 1260H, and both remain on the list the Department updated last month.² The Bureau of Industry and Security identified YMTC as a national security threat when it added the company to the Entity List in 2022. State-owned shareholders held over 35 percent of CXMT before its planned Shanghai listing, and CXMT moved into profit only after the global memory chip shortage took hold, after it ran heavy losses in earlier years that were sustained by state capital.³ Beijing has run this same playbook in countless critical supply chains before including steel, batteries, and shipbuilding, where state-subsidized capacity drove prices below market levels, forced trusted Western producers out of business, and made buyers dependent on America's chief adversary for vital goods.

Congress has also weighed in on the national security risks posed by CXMT and YMTC. Section 5949 of the FY 2023 NDAA barred federal agencies from acquiring products that use CXMT

¹ *Apple interest thrusts China's CXMT into memory chip spotlight*, Financial Times (July 8, 2026); see also *Apple begins testing CXMT chips for devices sold in China*, FT says, CNBC (July 8, 2026).

² U.S. Department of Defense, *Notice of Availability of Designation of Chinese Military Companies* pursuant to Section 1260H of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Jan. 7, 2025); U.S. Department of Defense, updated Section 1260H list (June 2026).

³ *Explainer: What is CXMT and how did it become China's DRAM champion?*, Reuters (July 15, 2026); *Memory Shortage Works Out for Chinese Chipmaker CXMT*, Caixin Global (May 19, 2026).

and YMTC semiconductors beginning in December 2027.⁴ If Apple pursues Chinese memory chips in its devices, it would be directly supporting a supply chain the U.S. government is legally bound to phase out of its devices.

As the most demanding component buyer in the world, a decision by Apple to procure Chinese memory chips would carry weight well beyond the company's own purchase orders. This validation would function as a signal that other buyers follow. That signal would arrive just as workers in Indiana, Idaho, New York, and Virginia carry out the largest expansion of domestic memory production in a generation, including the advanced packaging plant SK Hynix is building alongside Purdue University in West Lafayette, Indiana.⁵

Analysis indicates that CXMT's pricing is currently, in some cases, higher than that of global competitors, and CXMT has recently hiked prices on its existing customers.⁶ Even if Apple were able to negotiate lower initial pricing from CXMT, this does not justify the national security exposure that Apple would create by qualifying or integrating chips from a designated Chinese military supplier into its products. That exposure should weigh far more heavily on the company than any short-lived savings a supply arrangement might promise.

The limitation that CXMT memory would, for the moment, be confined to devices sold in China cannot be expected to hold, because once a part clears qualification for Apple production, extending it worldwide is a single procurement decision away. The revenue and reputational gains enjoyed by CXMT would hold regardless of where the finished device is eventually sold. Apple confronted a version of this very choice in 2022, when it evaluated YMTC NAND for the iPhone and, after congressional scrutiny, thought better of it.⁶

Accordingly, we request your responses to the following by August 21, 2026:

1. Will Apple commit that it will not incorporate CXMT or YMTC memory into any Apple product, whether sold in the United States or abroad? If not, please explain why.
2. Please describe the current status of Apple's testing or qualification of memory from CXMT, YMTC, and any other Chinese supplier, including which product lines and memory types, whether DRAM, NAND, or HBM, are involved.
3. What information about Apple's products, technical specifications, or product roadmaps has Apple shared, or would it share, with CXMT, YMTC, or their representatives in the course of qualification?

⁴ James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, Pub. L. No. 117-263, § 5949; Federal Acquisition Regulation, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FAR Case No. 2023-008 (Feb. 17, 2026) (prohibition effective Dec. 23, 2027).

⁵ *SK hynix Signs Investment Agreement of Advanced Chip Packaging with Indiana*, SK hynix Newsroom (Oct. 24, 2024); *Memory Capacity Production Slowly Expanding to Meet AI Industry Demand*, Forbes (July 12, 2026).

⁶ *How the 'twin stars' of China, CXMT and YMTC, changed the chip game*, Reuters (July 24, 2026).

⁶ *Apple now testing DRAM chips from banned Chinese memory supplier, per report*, 9to5Mac (July 8, 2026) (recounting Financial Times reporting that Apple evaluated YMTC NAND for the iPhone in 2022 and stepped back after congressional scrutiny).

4. Has Apple assessed whether memory from CXMT or YMTC relies on the intellectual property of United States or allied memory manufacturers, including whether those Chinese suppliers are licensed to the relevant patents, and what legal or supply exposure that would create for Apple's products?
5. Under a hypothetical procurement agreement, what access, if any, would CXMT, YMTC, or their personnel have to Apple's design, production, or supplier-management facilities in connection with this memory, and what data would that memory or those personnel be able to collect?
6. During the current shortage, has Apple asked any United States or allied memory manufacturer for additional supply, increased allocation, or priority over other customers, and what was the result?
7. Has Apple conducted any analysis of the supply chain security risks associated with sourcing memory from CXMT, YMTC, or other Chinese suppliers, including the risk of dependency on supply that could be restricted, controlled, disrupted, or terminated by the Chinese Communist Party or the Government of the People's Republic of China? If so, please describe that analysis and its conclusions.

The precedent Apple would set by addressing the memory shortage this way would shape the memory market and this country's security for years after supply has returned to normal, and we urge you to weigh that carefully before the company commits itself any further. We look forward to your response.

Sincerely,




Jim Banks
United States Senator




Charles E. Schumer
United States Senator




Mike Crapo
United States Senator



Jeanne Shaheen
United States Senator



Andy Kim
United States Senator



James E. Risch
United States Senator

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Pete Ricketts". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Pete" and last name "Ricketts" clearly distinguishable.

Pete Ricketts
United States Senator